Hunting and Fishing Rights, a Reprint from New York Law Forum by unknown
American Indian Law Review
Volume 1 | Number 1
1-1-1973
Hunting and Fishing Rights, a Reprint from New
York Law Forum
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hunting and Fishing Rights, a Reprint from New York Law Forum, 1 Am. Indian L. Rev. 79 (1973),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol1/iss1/10
HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS*
In Leech Lake Band of the Chippewa Indians v. Herbst,' the federal
district court held that the State of Minnesota could not enforce its
game and fish laws against members of the tribe who used public
lands of the Reservation, originally ceded by the tribe to the govern-
ment of the United States,2 for fishing, hunting, or ricing. The court
concluded that these rights were protected by the treaty signed with
the Leech Lake Band in 1855; 3 and that these treaty rights and the
Leech Lake Reservation proper survived the Nelson Act of 1889"
which had provided for the allotment of the Indian lands.5 The
court, however, did not go so far as to say that tribal hunting and
fishing were to be exclusively regulated by the tribe, reserving ulti-
mate jurisdiction for the federal courts.6 The present case falls into
a lengthy line of cases dealing with the tribal right to hunt and fish
on reservation land free from interference. This right is generally
recognized.7
Minnesota claimed that it had the right to enforce game and fish
laws on reservation land not held in fee by the Indians,8 on the
ground that the aboriginal hunting and fishing rights which the
tribe once possessed were absolutely terminated by the Nelson Act.'
Minnesota contended that this act effected a cession of the lands
owned by the tribe to the United States and extinguished all title to
the lands, including the hunting and fishing rights customarily asso-
ciated with Indian title. The state argued that traditional federal
jurisdiction 0 ended because the reservation no longer existed."
The court refused this argument, relying instead on the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Menominee Tribe v. United
States,2 Seymour v. Superintendent,3 and the Minnesota Supreme
Court decision in State v. Jackson.4 These cases had sustained the
tribe's assertion that it possessed aboriginal fishing and hunting
rights on the land in question.15 In substance, Chippewa follows the
reasoning applied in Menominee."'6 In both cases, the state had con-
tended that the Termination Act' 7 had abrogated all rights held by
the Indians and put an end to the reservation itself. Both courts held
that the earlier treaty rights of the Indians, regarding the use of the
land and water within the reservation, survived the subsequent ter-
mination legislation.
The Chippewa case turned on two agreements between the Leech
Lake Band and the United States: the treaty of 1855,1 and the Nel-
son Act of 1889.19 The treaty between the band and the United
*Reprinted with permission of the New York Law Forum.
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States in 1855 made no provisions for the preservation of Indian
hunting and fishing rights.20 The Nelson Act, 35 years later, allotted
parcels of the reservation land to members of the Chippewa tribe.
The portion of the reservation which remained after the allotment
was made available to white settlers.21 Essentially, the court was
called upon to determine the status of that portion of Leech Lake
reservation which had been ceded to the federal government by the
tribe for the use of white settlers.
The court was confronted with two interpretations of two docu-
ments. Minnesota and its Commission of Natural Resources relied
on the Nelson Act language and argued that the public lands of the
reservation were ceded in fee to the Government, terminating the
reservation and creating a new life style for the Indians of the reser-
vation lands.22
Relying on the treaty of 1855 and the interpretation given it by
the state court in Jackson,23 the United States and the Leech Lake
Band asserted that, as there was no explicit language in the later
act abrogating the terms of the treaty or the rights and privileges
implicitly recognized by it, then the hunting and fishing rights re-
main with the land.2 4
In determining the intent of Congress, the Chippewa court fol-
lowed the well-established principle that a federal treaty is not to be
casually abrogated,25 stating that it failed to discern the language
necessary to express such a nullification.20 In this way, the court finds
negative proof of congressional intent.
While the negative indicia of intent are addressed to the survival
of the treaty terms, there are also positive indicia employed by the
court to show that the reservation was never actually intended to be
terminated. The most important of these involved a comparison of
the language used in a statute27 which "vacated and restored to the
public domain ' 2 the Colville reservation in Washington. Such
language indicated to the court that Congress "if so minded"20 had
sufficient semantical resources to manifest clearly its intention to
abrogate treaty terms and extinguish reservations. Under the Sey-
mournl ruling, the court further concluded that Congress never in-
tended to abrogate the treaty, but also that the reservation still ex-
isted despite the allotment of the land. 2 Thus, the Court declared
that the reservation still existed.3
It would appear that the court's use of Seymour is less strained
than its reliance upon the Menominee decision. 4 In searching for
"positive" purposes of the termination statute, the Menominee
Court relied wholly upon Public Law 28o5 which was passed in
1953. This law made explicit provision for the preservation of tribal
8o
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hunting and fishing rights despite the end of federal jurisdiction. 6
The Chippewa court also employed this act to establish the intent
of Congress, but its use in the Chippewa fact pattern requires a
measure of mental gymnastics.
In Menominee, the statute clearly limited the language of the
Termination Act because Public Law 28o was in force before the
Termination Act.37 As the two acts are read in pari materia, the
Court concluded that it was not the intent of Congress to abrogate
the treaty rights of the tribe. The Court, however, clearly justified its
use of P.L. z8o 8 in determining the congressional intent by the fact
that the statute preceded the effect of the Termination Act the same
year.
39
The Nelson Act took force in 1889;40 P.L. z8o was enacted in
1953.41 Thus, the latter statute must be carefully limited as providing
only an indication of the twentieth-century interpretation of con-
gressional intent, and not as absolute proof of intent at the time that
the Nelson Act was drafted. The widespread use of P.L. 280 as a
means of establishing the intent of legislation passed half a century
before may lead the courts into the delusion that that act may be
used to lend support "whithersoever the governor listeth. 42 Clearly,
American society has already betokened its tragic confusion concern-
ing Indian history and culture.43 It would appear that the Chippewa
court endeavors to follow the reasoning of Menominee closely and
logically. In this laudable effort, the court has over-emphasized form
and deviated from the true spirit of Menominee, which was one of
careful consideration of all impinging, pertinent treaties and statutes
to reach a just result. It would do the Indian community a disservice
to rest their claim to justice upon the broad and indiscriminate use
of only partially relevant statutes. It is urged that the American
courts must take a stern hand in the matter by initiating a firm pat-
tern of careful analysis-one that is not prey to the changing de-
mands of national mood and sentiment. J.J.D.
NOTES
1. 334 F. Supp. looi (D. Minn. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Chippewal. Located
in north central Minnesota, the Leech Lake Reservation occupies 588,684 acres of
land. Eighty per cent of the reservation is presently owned by the local and federal
governments. More than 2,700 Chippewa Indian tribe members live on the land,
many of whom fish and hunt for sustenance and a livelihood.
2. Chippewa, id. at ioo6.
3. Treaty with the Chippewas, Act of Feb. 22, 1855, 1o Stat. 642.
4. Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642.
5. Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642. The terms of the act affected an allot-
ment of the Indian land, the communal Indian property being fragmentized into par-
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cels of land owned individually as private property. Those Indians who desired to
stay on what had previously been the reservation proper were issued patents in fee
to an allotted portion of the land which was to be held in trust for the Indian and his
heirs by the Government. The members of the tribe also had the option of removing
to the White Earth Reservation where the communal life-style would remain more
or less intact. Whatever land was not exhausted by allotments to the Indians was then
opened to white settlers.
6. The court distinguishes between "open" and "closed" reservations. Chippewa
supra note i, at ioo6. This distinction can only be as clear in any specific case as Con-
gress has made its intent known. State intervention with Indian affairs on reservation
land is severely limited. There are, however, situations where the jurisdiction of the
tribal court will be exclusive. In the case of the Navajo tribe, for example, the Federal
Government had gone to some lengths to strengthen and encourage the development
of the Navajo tribal courts. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Littel v. Nakal
344 F.2d 486 (9 th Cir. 1965). The test applied to determine whether the federal or
tribal court will have jurisdiction is whether the matter involved is "essential" (tribal)
or "nonessential" (federal) to the tribe's self-government. Arizona ex. rel. Merril v.
Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9 th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970). See Mc-
Clanahan v. State Tax Comm., 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P.2d 221 (1971).
7. In general, there are two parallel lines of decisions in the area of Indian hunting
and fishing rights. One line deals with the hunting and fishing rights on the reserva-
tion, as does the instant case. The other line deals with those rights in land formerly
held by the Indians which has been ceded by the tribe to the Federal Government.
The former line, dealing with on-reservation rights, is more consistent than the latter.
Generally, it has been held that a state has no right to control Indian hunting and
fishing on reservation land. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968),
aff'g 388 F.2d 998 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Metalakatala Indian Community v. Egan, 369
U.S. 45 (1962); Damath & Modoc Tribes v. Maison, 139 F. Supp. 634 (D. Ore.
1956); Mason v. Sams, 5 F.2d 255 (W.D. Wash. 1925); In re Blackbird, lo9 F. 139
(W.D. Wis. 191o); Elser v. Gill Net No. One, 246 Cal. App. 2d 30, 54 Cal. Rptr.
568 (1st Dist. 1966); State v. Jackson, 218 Minn. 429, 16 N.W.2d 752 (1944).
The line of cases dealing with hunting and fishing rights on lands which were once
part of a tribe's reservation, but which have since been ceded to the United States, has
been the subject of much more controversy. In general, it can be said that the tribal
Indians' rights are superior to the private citizen and landowner. Seufert Bros. Co. v.
United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919) (Indians' right to hunt and fish on ceded land
privately owned and used by other tribes or white men); United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371 (1905) (off-reservation hunting and fishing rights of Indians not to be termi-
nated by white private ownership of ceded land); United States v. Taylor, 3 Wash.
Terr. 38, 13 P. 333 (1887) (Indians could pass over white-owned land to reach fishing
stations.)
In the nineteenth century, the states' right to regulate Indian hunting and fishing
was held to be unqualified. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) rev'g 70 F. 598
(C.C.D. Wyo. 1895); United States v. The James G. Swan, 5c F. io8 (D. Wash.
1892). In the twentieth century, however, that view has been subject to qualification.
While the states retain the right to regulate Indian hunting and fishing on land off the
reservation, the courts have applied a number of tests to each situation. If the facts
warrant an interference by the state, the regulation will be allowed, but the state does
not have an absolute right to prosecute tribal members. Puyallup Tribe v. Department
of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (reasonable and necessary); Tulee v. Washington, 315
U.S. 681 (1942) (necessary); New York ex. rel. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556
8z
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(1916) (necessary); Maison v. Confederated Tribes, 314 F.2d 169 ( 9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.s. 829 (1963) (indispensable); Kautz v. Department of Game, 70
Wash. zd 275, 422 P.2d 771 (1967) (reasonable and necessary). In the last tvo
decades, there has been an opposing, though less vigorous, line of decisions on these
same issues. These cases hold that the tribes are free of all state regulation while off the
reservation by virtue of interpretation of the specific treaties involved. State v. Arthur,
74 Idaho 251, 261 P.zd 135 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954) (Indian hunt-
ing on "open and unclaimed land" was free of all regulation); People v. Jondreau, 384
Mich. 539, 185 N.W.2d 375 (1973) (tribal members free of all state regulation off-
reservation); State v. Satiacum, 50 Wash. 2d 513, 314 P.zd 400 (1957) (Indians free
to hunt and fish on ceded land without regulation). In view of this mixed precedent,
Minnesota, in Chippewa, chose to prove that the land involved was ceded to the
United States by the Nelson Act, Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642, rather
than to challenge the general principle established by case law that Indians are free
from state regulation of hunting and fishing while on the reservation. This would bring
the fact pattern out of the first category of decisions and into the second category
dealing with off-reservation hunting and fishing. In this framework, the state's chances
of prevailing were much greater in view of the Supreme Court rulings in Puyallup and
Kautz, supra.
8. Chippewa, supra n. 1, at .003. The Nelson Act, Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25
Stat. 642, made private landowners of those Indians who chose to stay at the
Leech Lake site. It has been clearly held that such land remained "Indian country"
and was retained under federal supervision. Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478
(1914); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914); State v. Jackson, supra n. 7.
9. Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642.
io. Federal jurisdiction is based upon the commerce clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
which reserves to the Federal Government the right "[tlo regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." A classic,
and frequently cited construction of this provision appears in Worchester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 535 (1832), where Chief Justice Marshall stated: "From the com-
mencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and inter-
course with the Indians, which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and mani-
fest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts...
manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities... "
Id. at 556-57. This decision was the foundation of a long line of cases which maintain
that Indian tribes are nations which fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Govern-
ment as dependent sovereigns, but are free from state intervention. See Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); United States v. Sante Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941);
Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. z18 (1897) (territorial government); Elk v. Wilkins, 112
U.S. 9 4 (1884).
ii. Chippewa, supra n. 1, at 1003. The implications of this reasoning are discussed
in n. 7 supra.
12. Supra n. 7"
13. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
14. Supra n.7.
15. In State v. Jackson, supra n. 7, a member of the Chippewa tribe was arrested
for trapping a partridge out of season on the Leech Lake Reservation. The court dis-
missed the conviction ruling that the state had no jurisdiction over Indians on reserva-
tion-allotted land. Accord, United States v. Pelican, supra note 8. For a discussion
of aboriginal Indian rights see Caldwell v. State, 1 Stew. & Potter (Ala.) 327 (1832).
The fact that the Indians were here long before any white man did nothing to stop
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Europeans from asserting their absolute title to the land. It was claimed on the basis
of "title by discovery." As early as the sixteenth century, the Indians' rights to their
land was a compelling enough question to draw urgings from the Pope that the Spanish
settlers respect the land title and rights of the American Indian. Pius III, Bull Sublimus
Deus (1537).
Anglo-American settlers in the eighteenth century were again confronted with the
same moral issue in the Northwest Ordinance, Act of July 13, 1787, art. V, which,
nevertheless, did little to restrain the settlers from taking the land they wanted. United
States v. Lucero, 1 N.M. 422 (1869); Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn. L. Rev.
28 (1947).
16. Supra n. 7
17. Cf. Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642, with Termination Act of 1954,
25 U.S.C. §§ 891.-9oz (1970). The crucial distinction to be made in the facts of these
two cases is that the Menominee case held that the reservation had been terminated,
but the tribe itself had not. Hence it was the tribe's right to hunt and fish on the
land in question which had survived the Termination Act. Menominee Tribe v. United
States, supra n. 7, at 412. In the Chippeiva decision, the court clearly held that the
state had failed to prove that the reservation had been terminated. Chippewa, supra
n. 1, at ioo6.
18. Act of Feb. 22, 1855, 1o Stat. 1165.
19. Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642.
zo. Act of Feb. 22, 1855, 1o Stat. 1165.
21. For a discussion of the legislative mechanics of this process see ns. 5, 7 supra.
22. Brief for the State of Minnesota at 11-15, Chippewa, supra n. 1.
23. Supra n. 7"
24. Brief for United States at 2-6, Chippewa, supra n. 1.
25. Menominee v. United States, supra n. 7, at 413. The U.S. Constitution as-
serts the supremacy of treaties made by the United States with other nations in the
eyes of the law. U.S. Const., art. VI. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929);
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920).
In 1871, Congress passed a bill which declared that the Federal Government no
longer "acknowledged or recognized" the Indian nations as independent powers "with
whom the United States may contract by treaty." The bill also provided, however, that
this act would not alter the quality of the terms of any treaty executed before the
statute. Act of March 3, 1872, ch. 12o, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
Again, in 1935, Congress asserted that there would be no lessening of any rights
already incurred under all treaties. Act of June 15, 1935, ch. .6o, § 4, 49 Stat. 378.
American courts had long been upholding the validity of Indian treaties. See United
States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876); Fellows v. Blacksmith,
6o U.S. 366 (1856); Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F. Cas. 344,
346 (No. 14, 251) (C.C. Mich. 1852). Under the Constitution, an Act of Congress
will supersede a prior inconsistent treaty. U.S. Const., art. VI, § 2; Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Head Money Cases, 212 U.S. 580 (1884).
However, the courts have been cautious in allowing treaties with the Indians to be
modified or abrogated. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 533 (1903); Ward v.
Race Horse, supra n. 7; The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (ii Wall.) 616, 622 (1870).
See also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1932).
26. In Menominee Tribe v. United States, supra n. 7, at 413, the Court refused
to accept a "backhand" abrogation of treaty rights conferred upon the Indians and de-
manded clear language to sustain any such termination of privilege. The classic ex-
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol1/iss1/10
pression is found in Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox,
Ltd., 291 U.S. 138 (1934), where the Court stated: "Such power [of abrogation] will
be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the government
in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the
country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so." Id. at 16o. And in Ward
v. Race Horse, supra n. 7, at 511, it was held "that repeals by implication are not
favored, and will not be held to exist if there be any other reasonable construction".
It is a basic rule that ambiguities in treaties between the United States and Indian
nations shall be resolved in favor of the Indians. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 U.S. 564 (1908); 34 Op. Att. Gen. 439, 444 (1925); F.S. Cohen, Handbook of
Indian Law 37 (1948). But see United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494,
531-3z (19oo), wherein the Court held that the plain meaning of words may not be
disregarded. This decision recognized the general principle described above but limits
it to bona fide ambiguities. Chippewa, supra n. i, at 1oo5. The Court found support
for the proposition that the Nelson Act, Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642,
was merely intended to open up certain territories on the reservation to white settlers.
See Seymour v. Superintendant, supra n. 13. The Nelson Act, Act of Jan. 14, 1889,
ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642, was part of what has been called the "Allotment Period" of
Indian-American relations. A further purpose was to "civilize" the Indian by instilling
in him the European pride in private property and pulling him away from his com-
munal roots. Kelly, Indian Adjustment and the History of Indian Affairs, io Ariz. L.
Rev. 565 (1968). See ns. 5, 8 supra.
27. Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, § 4, 27 Stat. 63.
28. Act of July 3, 1892, ch. 140 § 4, z7 Stat. 63. In Seymour v. Superintendent,
supra note 13, the Court contrasts the language in the 189z statute with the Act of
March 22, 19o6, ch. 1126, 34 Stat. 8o, which dealt with another section of the same
reservation. The Court found that the 1892 act did terminate a portion of the reserva-
tion while the 19o6 statute did not.
The 19o6 statute contained no language as explicit as the "vacated and restored
to public domain" phraseology in the former act. A further indication of intent dis-
cerned by the court was that the 1892 act had appropriated the proceeds for the "gen-
eral public use" while the 19o6 act had provided for appropriation "beneficial to the
tribe". Seymour v. Superintendant, supra n. 13, at 355-56. It should be noted that
the Nelson Act, Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642, 645, provided that the pro-
ceeds derived from the sale of the land to homesteaders were to be held in trust for
the Indians. See United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 192 (1926); United States
v. Mille Lac Band, 229 U.S. 498 (1913); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 375, 387
(1902).
29. Chippewa, supra n. 1, at loo0.
30. In comparing the Menominee, supra n. 7, situation with that of the case at
bar, the Chippewa court found that "[diespite unequivocal language [of termination
of all rights] the Supreme Court had held that while the language was effective to ter-
minate the reservation, it still did not abrogate Indian hunting and fishing rights."
Chippewa, supra n. 1, at 1005.
31. Supran. 13.
32. The Court in Seymour had held that the termination of a reservation turns upon
the termination of federal responsibility and not the termination of legal land title in
the Indians. It is apparent that the Nelson Act, Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat.
642, merely terminated the communal property title of the band and not the federal
jurisdiction over the band. This is clear from the Court's interpretation of congres-
sional intent. Seymour v. Superintendant, supra note 13, at 356; Chippewa, supra n. 1,
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at 3oo 5. Contra, Arnett v. 5 Gill Nets, 20 Cal. App. 3d 729, 97 Cal. Rpter. 894 (Ist
Dist. 1971). In this case, the court held that the allotment of reservation land in 1892
had terminated the reservation, and thus, an Indian fishing on the ceded land could be
prosecuted under state fishing laws. Although the court distinguishes its result from
that in Seymour v. Superintendant, supra n. 13, on the basis of indicia of Congressional
intent, it seems clear that the crux of the decision lies elsewhere in the court's
definition of a reservation. That is, the court holds that a reservation is "an area re-
served from homestead entry or other allotment to individual ownership ... ." In other
words, the reservation's existence depends upon communal land title. Arnett v. 5 Gill
Nets, supra at 735, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
33. See n. 7 supra for a discussion of the implications of this conclusion.
34. The Menominee decision, supra n. 7, involved the Termination Act of 1954,
z5 U.S.C. § 891-902 (1970). That act provided for the "orderly termination" of the
Government's supervision over the "property and members" of the tribe. It also pro-
vided for the uniform application of state laws to tribal members "in the same man-
ner" as they would apply to non-Indian citizens of the state. 25 U.S.C. §§ 891, 899
(1970).
35. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 116z
(1970).
36. The act gave certain states, including Minnesota, exclusive jurisdiction over
criminal matters of the Indian reservations. 18 U.S.C. § 18(a) (1970). U.S.C. §
1162(b) (1970) states that Congress has no desire to effect the cancelling of any
treaty terms by this shift of responsibility.
The history of Indian-American relations follows roughly the same pattern as the
development of legislation in this area. Congress has passed through four main peri-
ods in its attitudes towards the Indians and their problem-more usually they were
concerned only with the problems of their constituencies. And their confusion and in-
evitable chagrin at the red man's "ingratitude" was great.
The first period might be called the "Reservation Period" during which treaties
were made with the Indian tribes creating special areas of land within which the In-
dians could exist in their ancient manner, and where, in turn, they would not encumber
the spread of the white settlers over the land.
As the eastern lands became congested with settlers, the thrust towards the West
grew stronger. In the 188o's the second period began, the "Allotment Period." The
purpose of the "Allotment Acts" was two-fold. First, by breaking up the reservations,
Congress hoped to free new land for settlement. Secondly, by "alloting" land as pri-
vate property to the Indians, it was hoped that the Indians would shed their communal
past and assume the European traditions of private property and private enterprise.
See supra n. 26.
37- Menominee v. United States, supra n. 7, at 410.
38. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1970).
39. Menominee v. United States, supra n. 7, at 410.
40. Act of Jan. 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642.
41. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1970).
42. James 3:3-5- "Behold, we put bits in the horses' mouth, that they may obey us;
and we turn about their whole body. Behold also the ships, which though they be so
great, and are driven of fierce winds, yet are turned about with a very small helm,
whithersoever the governor listeth. Even so the tongue is a little member, and boasteth
great things. Behold, how great a matter a little fire kindleth."
86
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43. The difficulty arises from the problem of dealing with a foreign independent
nation existing within the boundaries of the United States. Whatever the degree of
assimilation, the Indian ethos remains a vital entity, trapped in the alien American
culture. And the situation has been aggravated by legislative confusion.
The Allotment Period drew to a close with the Indian Reorganization Act of June
18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-9z (1970). It was this
bill that finally reversed the devastating effects of the Reservation and Allotment
Periods. Funds were appropriated for the purchase of new lands for tribal use, tribal
traditions and functions were renewed, and loans were made available to the tribes.
This might well be termed the "Period of Re-integration."
The last period began in 1953 and can be called the Period of Termination. With
H.R. Con. Res. No. io8, 83d Cong., ist Sess. (1953), a movement began for the rapid
assimilation of the Indian tribes into American culture. This was to be accomplished
by the "termination" of all federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs. Individual states
were to exercise the same control over tribes that they had over all other citizens.
Kelly, supra n. z6, at 571. It is clear, then, that the Indian problem calls for a care-
ful evaluation of not only the tribes and their rights, but of our own motives and some-
times selfish impulses. As Justice Frankfurter has written, the development of an In-
dian-American policy calls for "an appreciation of history and understanding of the
economic, social, political and moral problems in which the more immediate prob-
lems of (Indian) law are entwined." Quoted in F.S. Cohen, supra n. 26, at 5.
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